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UNDERSTANDINGWELLNESS
INTERNATIONAL NETWORK, LTD. V. SHARIF:
THE PROBLEMS WITH ALLOWING PARTIES
TO IMPLIEDLY CONSENT TO BANKRUPTCY
COURT ADJUDICATION OF STERN CLAIMS
ABSTRACT
The 2011 Supreme Court case Stern v. Marshall defined which claims
bankruptcy courts had the authority to adjudicate, but its complicated
holding left lower courts perplexed. Specifically, the Stern decision created
“Stern claims”—claims that bankruptcy courts have the statutory, but not
the constitutional, authority to adjudicate. Subsequent cases, such as
Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison and Wellness International
Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, have grappled with whether Stern claims should be
treated as “core” claims, which bankruptcy courts can enter final judgments
on, or “non-core” claims, which bankruptcy courts can only enter final
judgments on if the litigating parties consent. The Supreme Court in Wellness
held that parties could impliedly consent to Stern claim adjudication by
bankruptcy courts, but the Court’s test to determine implied consent is
ambiguous and has caused further disagreement among lower courts. This
Note analyzes the Court’s interpretation of parties’ implied consent to
bankruptcy court adjudication of Stern claims in Wellness, explains why the
interpretation is too broad, and offers solutions to narrow consent in these
cases. Potential solutions include: (1) creating a narrower definition of Stern
claims; (2) extending the holding of Executive Benefits and addressing
consent; (3) amending Section 157 or Federal Bankruptcy Rule 7012(b) to
include Stern claims; and (4) implementing the “balancing test” used in
cases decided prior to Stern to determine whether bankruptcy courts have
the authority to adjudicate certain claims.
INTRODUCTION
This “suit has, in course of time, become so complicated that. . . no two. . .
lawyers can talk about it for five minutes, without coming to a total
disagreement as to all the premises. Innumerable children have been born
into the cause: innumerable young people have married into it;” and, sadly,
the original parties “have died out of it.” A “long procession of [judges] has
come in and gone out” during that time, and still the suit “drags its weary
length before the Court.”1
1. Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 468 (2011) (quoting CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE
4–5 (1891)).
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This is how the U.S. Supreme Court opened its opinion in the 2011 case
Stern v. Marshall.2 For years, Stern defined which claims bankruptcy courts
had the authority to adjudicate and, needless to say, its convoluted holding
left many judges, attorneys, and litigants perplexed. Specifically, the Stern
Court created what is now commonly referred to as “Stern claims”—claims
that bankruptcy courts have the statutory, but not constitutional authority, to
adjudicate.3 Successor cases such as Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v.
Arkison4 and Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif 5 attempted to
answer questions about Stern claims that the Stern Court left unanswered.
These cases grappled with whether Stern claims should be treated like “core”
claims—claims that bankruptcy courts can enter final judgments on—or
“non-core” claims—claims that bankruptcy courts can only enter final
judgments on if the litigating parties consent.6 TheWellness Court ultimately
held that parties could impliedly consent to Stern claim adjudication by
bankruptcy courts, but the Supreme Court’s test to determine implied consent
is ambiguous and has caused disagreement among lower courts.7
This Note analyzes theWellnessCourt’s interpretation of parties’ implied
consent to bankruptcy court adjudication of Stern claims, explains why the
interpretation is too broad, and offers solutions to narrow consent in these
cases. Part I of this Note discusses the statutory and common law history of
bankruptcy court authority prior to Stern, and the statutes that currently
govern bankruptcy court authority. Part II first discusses Stern, the creation
of Stern claims, and the problems the Stern Court caused by remaining silent
on whether bankruptcy courts could adjudicate Stern claims. Part II then
discusses Executive Benefits, the case decided prior toWellness, which partly
answered questions left unanswered by Stern, but still remained silent on
whether parties could consent to bankruptcy court adjudication of Stern
claims. Part III discusses the Wellness case and its overbroad view on
allowing parties to impliedly consent to bankruptcy court authority for Stern
claims, as well as the problems this holding creates. Part IV proposes and
analyzes possible solutions to Wellness’ interpretation of implied consent,
including: (1) creating a narrower definition of Stern claims; (2) extending
the holding of Executive Benefits and addressing consent; (3) amending
Section 1578 or Federal Bankruptcy Rule 7012(b)9 to include Stern claims;
and (4) implementing the “balancing test” used in cases decided prior to Stern
2. See generally id.
3. See id. at 469.
4. See generally Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014).
5. See generally Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932 (2015).
6. See Exec. Benefits, 134 S. Ct. at 2171–72.
7. See generally Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1947–48.
8. See generally Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2012)).
9. See generally FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012.
2016] Bankruptcy Court Adjudication of Stern Claims 237
to determine whether bankruptcy courts have the authority to adjudicate
certain claims.
I. HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY COURT AUTHORITY
A. THE BANKRUPTCYACT OF 1898, BANKRUPTCYREFORM ACT
OF 1978, ANDNORTHERN PIPELINE
The history of United States bankruptcy law is volatile, with many of the
statutes promulgated in the early and mid 1800s being quickly repealed. The
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (1898 Act) was the first set of bankruptcy laws that
remained in effect for an extended period of time, nearly eighty years.10 The
1898 Act “marked the beginning of the era of permanent federal bankruptcy
legislation” and addressed many procedural questions left unanswered by
prior legislation.11
Originally, under the 1898 Act, federal district courts “sat as ‘courts of
bankruptcy,’” but the courts often assigned bankruptcy proceedings to
bankruptcy “referees.”12 These referees were first paid on a fee basis, but in
1946 they began receiving salaried monetary compensation.13 In 1973, the
referees became known as “bankruptcy judges.”14 These bankruptcy judges
exercised many of the same powers as the district court judges, but state
courts also had concurrent jurisdiction over similar bankruptcy issues.15 This
jurisdictional overlap between state and federal judges led to frequent
litigation and a demand for a more comprehensive outline of federal
bankruptcy court authority.16 Overall, the 1898 Act allowed bankruptcy
judges to decide “traditional summary jurisdiction” matters over claims such
as the distribution of the bankruptcy estate among creditors.17 However, the
bankruptcy judges, with the parties’ consent, could also decide matters that
invoked the district courts’ “plenary jurisdiction.”18
Although the 1898 Act remained intact for many years, Congress
overhauled federal bankruptcy law and enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act
10. See Charles J. Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 5, 23 (1995).
11. Id. at 23, 25.
12. Id. at 25; see also Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2170 (2014).




17. Exec. Benefits, 134 S. Ct. at 2170. “Summary jurisdiction” means that the courts generally
had exclusive jurisdiction over these claims. See Tabb, supra note 10, at 25 n.167.
18. Exec. Benefits, 134 S. Ct. at 2170. “Plenary jurisdiction”means that, if the parties consented,
bankruptcy courts could adjudicate certain claims, usually reserved for Article III courts. See Tabb,
supra note 10, at 25 n.167; see also Joshua C. Gerber, Note, “Why the Fuss?” Stern v. Marshall
and the Supreme Court’s Understanding of Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 989,
998 (2013).
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of 1978 (1978 Act).19 The 1978 Act “strove to create a more unified
jurisdictional framework” and removed the referee/bankruptcy judge system
and the distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction.20 Instead, each
judicial district established a bankruptcy court that was headed by bankruptcy
judges.21 The bankruptcy courts—like federal district courts—had the broad
power to decide “all civil proceedings arising under Title 11 [of the
Bankruptcy Code] or arising in or related to cases under Title 11.”22 The
President, with the consent of the Senate, appointed bankruptcy judges to
fourteen-year terms without salary guarantees, unlike federal judges, who
receive life tenure and guaranteed non-diminishable salary.23 Therefore,
although the bankruptcy courts were given broad power and authority,
Article III of the U.S. Constitution still did not protect bankruptcy judges.24
Article III of the Constitution outlines federal judges’ powers and gives
these judges the benefits of life tenure and non-diminishable pay; Article III
does not define bankruptcy courts and bankruptcy judges’ powers or
benefits.25 As a result, bankruptcy courts had similar powers to federal courts
under the 1978 Act but were not afforded the same benefits under Article
III.26 The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of bankruptcy
judges’ authority under the 1978 Act in the landmark 1982 case Northern
Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.27
In Northern Pipeline, the appellant, Northern Pipeline Construction
Company (Northern), filed a petition for reorganization in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Minnesota in January 1980.28 In March
of 1980, pursuant to the 1978 Act, Northern filed suit against the appellee,
Marathon Pipe Line Company (Marathon), in the same bankruptcy court.29
Northern sought damages for breaches of contract and warranty, and for
misrepresentation, coercion, and duress.30 Marathon countered that the 1978
Act “unconstitutionally conferred [Article III] judicial power upon judges
19. See Bethany A. Corbin, Losing at Dodge Ball: Understanding the Supreme Court’s Implied
Authorization of Consent in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison and Why Revision of
28 U.S.C. § 157(B) is Critical for Clarity, 63 DRAKE L. REV. 109, 118 (2015).
20. Id. (citing N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53 (1982)).
21. Id.
22. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1939 (2015) (citation omitted).
23. See N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 53.
24. See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2171 (2014).
25. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (Article III of the Constitution vests judicial power of the United
States “in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices
during good behav[ior], and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which
shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.”).
26. See Exec. Benefits, 134 S. Ct. at 2171.
27. See generally N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 57–58; see also Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1939.
28. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 56.
29. Id.
30. See id.
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who lacked life tenure and protection against salary diminution.”31 The
Supreme Court held that there was “no doubt” that bankruptcy judges were
not Article III judges, and therefore deemed certain sections of the 1978 Act
unconstitutional.32 The Court boldly stated:
[Section 241(a) of] the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, has impermissibly removed
most, if not all, of ‘the essential attributes of the judicial power’ from the
Art. III district court, and has vested those attributes in a non-Art. III
adjunct. Such a grant of jurisdiction cannot be sustained as an exercise of
Congress’ power to create adjuncts to Art. III courts.33
The Northern Pipeline Court, with its strict holding, set the foundation for
the current rules governing bankruptcy court authority.
B. THE BANKRUPTCYAMENDMENTS, THE FEDERAL JUDGESHIP
ACT OF 1984, ANDCURRENT BANKRUPTCYCOURTAUTHORITY
Northern Pipeline stripped bankruptcy courts of their long-held powers,
but Congress combatted this lost authority with the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (1984 Act).34 The 1984 Act, which
remains in effect today, gives district courts “original jurisdiction over
bankruptcy cases and related proceedings,” but allows the district courts to
refer these cases to bankruptcy courts.35
Claims referred to bankruptcy judges fall into two categories: “core”
claims and “non-core” claims.36 Core claims are “all cases under Title 11 and
all core proceedings arising under Title 11, or arising in a case under Title
11. . . .”37 The 1984 Act provides a non-exhaustive list of core claims,
including “counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against
the estate”38 and “proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent
conveyances.”39 Most importantly, the 1984 Act allows bankruptcy judges to
“hear and determine” core claims and order final judgments on them.40
Non-core claims are claims that are not core but are nevertheless
“otherwise related to a case under [T]itle 11.”41 On non-core claims,
bankruptcy judges can only “propose[] findings of fact and conclusions of
31. Id. at 56–57.
32. Id. at 61.
33. Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
34. See generally Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2012)); Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135
S. Ct. 1932, 1939 (2015).
35. Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1939.
36. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2171 (2014).
37. Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 §104(a); 28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(1).
38. Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 §104(a); 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H).
40. Id. § 157(b)(1).
41. Id. § 157(c)(1).
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law to the district court.”42However, parties can consent to bankruptcy courts
having final judgment authority on non-core claims.43 As such, bankruptcy
judges can enter final judgments on core claims, and those judgments can be
appealed to the district court. Bankruptcy judges cannot enter final judgments
on non-core claims, unless the parties consent to bankruptcy court
adjudication.44
The 1984 Act seemingly restored the authority of bankruptcy courts
established by previous Acts.45 However, differences arose among the courts
between what constituted a core versus non-core claim. In some cases, courts
applied a balancing test to determine whether or not a claim was a core or
non-core matter. This balancing test included weighing the “policy purposes
of [bankruptcy] courts with the need of protections of the Article III courts”
and the possible “encroachment of separation of the branches of
government.”46
Only four years after Congress adopted the 1984 Act, the Supreme Court
began to question bankruptcy court authority once again and the legitimacy
of the 1984 Act’s core and non-core distinction. In Granfinanciera v.
Nordberg,47 the Court held that “fraudulent conveyance” actions were
considered core proceedings under the 1984 Act, but the “Seventh
Amendment [right to a jury trial] still applied to such claims.”48 Conversely,
in Langenkamp v. Culp,49 the Court held that no Seventh Amendment right
to a jury trial existed for creditors submitting claims against the bankruptcy
estate when a “bankruptcy trustee counterclaimed for preferential
transfers.”50 The line between core and non-core claims and the question of
whether bankruptcy courts infringed on federal court authority remained
unsettled, and these issues were arguably further complicated by the highly
controversial decision in Stern v. Marshall.
42. Id.
43. See id. § 157(c)(2).
44. See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2171–72 (2014).
45. See Corbin, supra note 19, at 121. Like the 1898 Act, the 1984 Act establishes a summary-
plenary-like divide between bankruptcy and federal district courts, where upon consent of the
litigating parties, bankruptcy courts could have final adjudication over decisions usually reserved
for the district courts. See id.
46. Michelle Wright, From Stem to Stern: Navigating Bankruptcy Practice After Stern v.
Marshall, 77 MO. L. REV. 1159, 1172 (2012) (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod. Co.,
473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985)); see generally Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 851 (1986) (using different factors to determine whether an Article III violation occurred).
47. See generally Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 36 (1989).
48. Wright, supra note 46, at 1173 (citing Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 36–37).
49. See generally Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 1043 (1991).
50. Wright, supra note 46, at 1174.
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II. STERN AND EXECUTIVE BENEFITS
A. STERN FACTS, MAJORITYOPINION, ANDDISSENT
1. The Facts
The 2011 Supreme Court decision in Stern v. Marshall diminished parts
of the statutory authority vested in bankruptcy courts. As previously
mentioned, the facts of this case are lengthy and detailed, but also
subjectively controversial because of the petitioner’s identity. Petitioner
Vickie Lynn Marshall (Vickie), known to the public as model and actress
Anna Nicole Smith, married J. Howard Marshall (J. Howard), an oil tycoon
and one of the richest men in Texas, one year before his death.51 J. Howard
did not include Vickie in his will and before he died, Vickie filed suit in Texas
state probate court against J. Howard’s son, E. Pierce Marshall (Pierce),52
alleging that Pierce “fraudulently induced J. Howard to sign a living trust that
did not include” Vickie.53 After J. Howard died, Vickie filed a bankruptcy
petition in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California.54
First, Pierce filed a complaint in this bankruptcy proceeding, alleging that
Vickie had defamed him, because she told the press that Pierce used fraud to
gain his father’s assets.55 Then, Pierce filed a proof of claim for the
defamation action, so he could recover potential damages from Vickie’s
bankruptcy estate.56 Vickie counterclaimed for tortious interference, alleging
that Pierce prevented J. Howard from “taking the legal steps necessary” to
provide Vickie with J. Howard’s assets.57
In November 1999, the bankruptcy court granted Vickie summary
judgment on Pierce’s defamation claim and later also granted Vickie’s
tortious interference counterclaim.58 The court awarded her over $400
million in compensatory damages and $25 million in punitive damages.59
Pierce appealed to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California, arguing that Vickie’s counterclaim was not a core proceeding
under Section 157(b)(2)(C) (“counterclaims by the estate against persons
filing claims against the estate”)60 and, therefore, the bankruptcy court did
not have the power to enter final judgment.61 The district court partially
agreed with Pierce, stating that Vickie’s counterclaim did in fact fall within
51. See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 468–69 (2011).
52. See id. at 470.
53. Id.
54. See generally Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 300 (2006).




59. Id. at 470–71.
60. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (2012).
61. See Stern, 564 U.S. at 471.
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the statutory language of Section 157(b)(2)(C), but that it would be
“unconstitutional to hold that any and all counterclaims are core.”62 At this
time, the Texas state probate court had ruled in Pierce’s favor, but the district
court denied the state court’s judgment, and decided the matter in Vickie’s
favor, awarding her compensatory and punitive damages each in the amount
of $44,292,767.33.63 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court, reasoning that a counterclaim under Section
157(b)(2)(C) is a core claim “only if the counterclaim is so closely related to
[a creditor’s] proof of claim that the resolution of the counterclaim is
necessary to resolve the allowance or disallowance of the claim itself.”64 The
Ninth Circuit held that Vickie’s tortious interference counterclaim did not
meet this test and reinstated the Texas state probate court’s holding against
Vickie.65
Vickie appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that the
bankruptcy court had the statutory authority under Section 157(b)(2)(C) to
enter judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim, but that it did not have the
constitutional authority to do so.66
2. The Majority Opinion
The opinion in Stern, written by Chief Justice Roberts, can be broken
down into three main parts. First, the Court conceded that Vickie’s tortious
interference counterclaim against Pierce was “a ‘core proceeding’ under the
plain text of Section 157(b)(2)(C)” and, therefore, the bankruptcy court had
statutory authority to adjudicate the claim.67 However, the Supreme Court,
quoting the reasoning of Northern Pipeline, noted that Article III of the
Constitution is “an inseparable element of the constitutional system of checks
and balances”68 that “imposes some basic limitations that the other branches
may not transgress.”69 The Court noted that Article III permits judges to serve
without term limits and restricts the other branches’ ability to remove the
judges or lessen their salaries, to ensure the “‘[c]lear heads . . . and honest
hearts’ deemed ‘essential to good judges.’”70 The Court therefore concluded
that Congress, by bestowing non-Article III judges with the statutory
authority to adjudicate certain core bankruptcy claims, did in fact
62. See id.
63. See id. at 472.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 472–73; see alsoMarshall v. Stern (In reMarshall), 600 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir.
2010) (stating that the “Texas probate court entered judgment in favor of Pierce Marshall on all
claims”).
66. See Stern, 564 U.S. at 469.
67. Id. at 475.
68. Id. at 482–83 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58
(1982)).
69. Id. at 483.
70. Id. at 484 (quoting JAMESWILSON, COLLECTEDWORKS OF JAMESWILSON: VOLUME 1 363
(J. Andrews ed. 1896)).
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unconstitutionally transgress limits imposed by Article III, as only Article III
judges may preside over some core bankruptcy proceedings.71
While the Court wrote at length about the importance of Article III and
the separation of powers, it held only “that § 157(b)(2)(C) permits the
Bankruptcy Court to enter final judgment on Vickie’s counterclaim, [but]
Article III of the Constitution does not.”72 The Court remained silent on
whether Section 157(b) is unconstitutionally void and on how to proceed
when claims arise that bankruptcy courts have statutory, but not
constitutional authority to adjudicate.
Second, the Court rejected Vickie’s argument that her tortious
interference counterclaim was “a matter of public right” that could be
adjudicated outside the limitations of Article III courts.73 To be a matter of
public right, or as the Court put it, to fall under the “public rights exception,”
a claimmust be “integrally related to a particular federal government action,”
such as a claim derived “from a federal regulatory scheme” or a claim that
needs to be resolved by “an expert government agency.”74 The Court
concluded that Vickie’s state law counterclaim did not fall within the public
rights exception, because it did “not flow from a federal regulatory
scheme.”75 Also, the “experts” at solving Vickie’s state law counterclaim
were not government agencies, but rather Article III courts.76
Third, the Supreme Court rejected Vickie’s argument that the
Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to hear her counterclaim because, under
the 1984 Act, bankruptcy courts are “adjuncts” of district courts.77 Citing
Northern Pipeline, the Court stated that adjunct courts issue final judgments
on narrow, specialized areas of law; however, bankruptcy courts had not been
resolving specialized cases, but were overseeing broader claims related to
bankruptcy law.78 The Court thus quickly dismissed Vickie’s contention,
concluding that “a bankruptcy court can no more be deemed a mere ‘adjunct’
of the district court than a district court can be deemed such an ‘adjunct’ of
the court of appeals.”79
3. The Dissent
Stern v. Marshall was a five-to-four decision, and the dissenting judges
pointed out the problems with the Stern holding that would later reverberate
throughout the lower courts for years. First, Justice Breyer expressed
pragmatic concerns with the majority’s opinion. “[T]he volume of
71. See id. at 485–87.
72. Id. at 482.
73. Id. at 488.
74. Id. at 490.
75. Id. at 493.
76. Id. at 494.
77. Id. at 500.
78. See id. (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 485 U.S. 50, 85 (1982)).
79. Id.
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bankruptcy cases,” he wrote, “is staggering, involving almost 1.6 million
filings last year, compared to a federal district court docket of around 280,000
civil cases and 78,000 criminal cases.”80 Bankruptcy court cases “constantly”
involved state law claims like the one at issue in Stern; therefore, the majority
failed to answer the question of whether federal district courts would have to
review these cases and thus increase their caseload.81 A concern also arose
over whether the holding in Stern would have an impact outside the
bankruptcy court system. For instance, if bankruptcy courts could not issue
final judgments because the judges are not protected by Article III, then
“what about other non-Article III judges, such as federal magistrate judges,
and their ability to issue final judgments?”82 The dissent addressed these
concerns, mainly by relying on pre-Stern case law.83 Specifically, the
dissenting justices suggested the revival of the balancing test used in prior
cases. Justice Breyer proposed a five factor-balancing test that would help
determine whether bankruptcy courts encroached on Article III courts’
authority. The five factors are: (1) the nature of the claim; (2) the nature of
the tribunal; (3) Article III courts’ control over the proceeding; (4) parties’
consent; and (5) legislative purpose served by the grant of authority to a non-
Article III tribunal where judges lack tenure and compensation protections.84
B. THE PROBLEMS WITH STERN
1. The Creation of the “Stern Claim” and the “Stern Gap”
Stern caused an outpouring of litigation, with courts disagreeing over
what the case held. For instance, the Supreme Court in Stern clearly stated
that its holding was “narrow;”85 however, just a year after the case was
decided, more than 506 decisions referenced the opinion.86 The majority of
lower courts followed the Supreme Court’s opinion that the decision was
narrow, and that bankruptcy courts were not completely divested of authority
to adjudicate counterclaims.87 Other courts broadly interpreted Stern as
holding that any claim that “augment[s] the [bankruptcy] estate” can only be
80. Id. at 520 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
81. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism Without a Foundation: Stern v. Marshall, 2011 SUP.
CT. REV. 183, 184 (2011).
82. Id.
83. See generally Stern, 564 U.S. at 505–21.
84. Id. at 513.
85. See id. at 502.
86. See Corbin, supra note 19, at 129.
87. See id. at 129–30 n.157–58. For instance, in In re Salander O’ Reilly Galleries, LLC, a New
York bankruptcy case, the Court explained that Stern v. Marshall was “replete with language
emphasizing that the ruling should be limited to the unique circumstances of that case.” In re
Salander O’Reilly Galleries, 453 B.R. 106, 115 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 475 B.R. 9 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
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heard by Article III judges.88Aside from the split in interpretation, the biggest
problem with Stern was that it created “Stern claims.” Stern claims are
intermediary types of claims that are not classified as core or non-core, but
as claims that bankruptcy courts have statutory, rather than constitutional
authority to adjudicate.89 An example of a Stern claim was Vickie’s tortious
interference counterclaim in Stern v. Marshall.90 Although the bankruptcy
court had the statutory authority under Section 157(b)(2)(C) to adjudicate the
claim, this type of counterclaim is constitutionally reserved for Article III
judges.91 Further, Stern never supplied a list, non-exhaustive or otherwise, of
Stern claims and did not address how bankruptcy or district courts should
proceed when Stern claims are identified.92
Some lower courts also noted that Stern claims create a statutory “gap”
in Section 157.93 For instance, under Section 157(b), a bankruptcy court has
final judgment authority on core claims, but not on Stern claims.94 A
bankruptcy court cannot propose findings of fact or conclusions of law on
Stern claims either, as this procedure only applies to non-core claims.
Therefore, bankruptcy courts have no statutory power to act on Stern claims,
thus creating a gap in Section 157.95
2. No Ruling on Consent
Stern also did not address whether parties can consent to bankruptcy
court adjudication of Stern claims.96 The circuit courts split on the issue, with
the Ninth Circuit holding that parties had statutory authority under Section
157(c)(2) to consent to bankruptcy court adjudication of Stern claims.97
Others, such as the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, held that Section
157(c)(2) did not give parties the authority to consent to bankruptcy court
judgment on these claims.98
88. Corbin, supra note 19, at 130 n.162; see generally Burton v. Seaport Capital, LLC (In re
Direct Response Media, Inc.), 466 B.R. 626, 639–44 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (discussing both the
broad and narrow Stern interpretations).
89. See Stern, 564 U.S. at 469.
90. See generally id. at 482.
91. See id. “Although . . . . § 157(b)(2)(C) permits the Bankruptcy Court to enter final judgment
on Vickie’s counterclaim, Article III of the Constitution does not.” Id.
92. See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2168 (2014).
93. See id. at 2172.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 2172–73.
96. See Corbin, supra note 19, at 131.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 132. In Frazin v. Haynes & Boone, LLP, the Fifth Circuit held that the parties could
not consent to bankruptcy court adjudication of state law claims. Frazin v. Haynes & Boone, LLP
(In re Frazin), 732 F.3d 313, 320–21 n.3 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1770 (2014). Also,
when the Seventh Circuit first heard Wellness International Network Ltd. v. Sharif, it held that the
parties could not consent to bankruptcy court adjudication. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif,
727 F.3d 751, 771–73 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. granted in part, 134 S. Ct. 2901 (2014), rev’d, 135 S.
Ct. 1932 (2015).
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C. THE INITIALMEDIATOR: EXECUTIVE BENEFITS
In 2014, the Supreme Court, in Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v.
Arkison, attempted to solve the issues left unresolved by Stern. In Executive
Benefits, Bellingham Insurance Agency, Inc. (BIA) filed a voluntary Chapter
7 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western
District of Washington.99 The respondent, Peter Arkison, was the bankruptcy
trustee and filed a complaint in the same bankruptcy court against Executive
Benefits Insurance Agency (EBIA), the petitioner, claiming the fraudulent
conveyance of assets from BIA to EBIA.100 The bankruptcy court ruled in
favor of Arkison, and the district court affirmed.101While EBIA’s appeal was
pending, the Supreme Court handed down its ruling in Stern that some claims
cannot be adjudicated by bankruptcy courts due to the lack of constitutional
authority (i.e., Stern claims).102 Because of Stern, EBIA moved to dismiss
based on the bankruptcy court’s lack of jurisdiction.103 The Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit nonetheless affirmed the District Court’s ruling in favor
of Arkison.104
The Supreme Court held that Arkison’s claim of fraudulent conveyance
of assets was in fact a Stern claim.105 The Court conceded that Stern claims
seemingly created a “gap” in Section 157, but noted that this gap was
remedied by a note following 28 U.S.C. Section 151. 106 This note contains a
severability provision, which states that “if any provision of this Act. . . is
held invalid, the remainder of this Act . . . is not affected thereby.”107 The
Supreme Court reasoned that Stern claims “held invalid” the “application” of
Section 157(b); in other words, Stern claims could not be treated as core
claims.108However, by applying the severability provision, the rest of Section
157 is not affected. Therefore, the Court ruled that courts may apply Section
157(c) to Stern claims and treat them like non-core claims.109 Overall, the
Court held that bankruptcy courts did not have final judgment authority on
Stern claims, just like they do not have final judgment authority on non-core
claims. The Court remained silent on whether parties could consent to
bankruptcy court adjudication of Stern claims.110
99. See generally Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2169 (2014).
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. See id.; see generally Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 482 (2011).
103. See Exec. Benefits, 134 S. Ct. at 2169.
104. See id.
105. Id. at 2174.
106. Id. at 2173.
107. Id. (quoting Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, §104(a), 98 Stat. 333 (1984)
(codified as amended at note following 28 U.S.C. § 151 (2012)).
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. See generally id. at 2172–75.
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III. FINALLY ADDRESSING CONSENT:WELLNESS
A.WELLNESS FACTS ANDHOLDING
In Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, the Supreme Court
finally clarified whether or not parties could consent to bankruptcy court
adjudication of Stern claims. Similar to Stern, Wellness was “a decade-long
saga spanning two circuits.”111 Petitioner Wellness International Network
(Wellness), a manufacturer of health products, entered into a contract with
the respondent, Richard Sharif.112 Wellness and Sharif’s subsequent troubled
relationship prompted Sharif to sue Wellness in the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Texas in 2005.113 A default judgment was entered for
Wellness because Sharif repeatedly ignored various “litigation
obligations.”114 The district court eventually sanctioned Sharif and awarded
more than $650,000 in attorneys’ fees to Wellness.115
Sharif filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Illinois in February 2009 and listed Wellness as a
creditor.116 Wellness investigated Sharif’s assets and discovered a 2002 loan
application Sharif filed “listing more than $5 million in assets.”117 Sharif
admitted he lied on the loan application and that the assets were actually
owned by the Soad Wattar Living Trust, “an entity Sharif said he
administered on behalf of his mother.”118 Wellness then filed an adversary
complaint against Sharif in the bankruptcy court.119 The first four counts of
the complaint alleged that Sharif’s debts should not be discharged because he
“concealed property by claiming it was owned by the Trust.”120 In the fifth
count of the complaint, Wellness sought a declaratory judgment stating that
the Trust was “Sharif’s alter ego” and that the Trust’s assets should be
included in his estate for bankruptcy proceedings.121 Sharif agreed that the
current proceeding against him was a “core proceeding” allowing the
Bankruptcy Court to enter final judgment, subject to appeal.122
Once again, Sharif ignored his legal obligations and, in July 2010, the
Bankruptcy Court entered a default and declaratory judgment against him.123
Sharif appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s decision to the District Court, just as
111. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751, 754 (7th Cir. 2013).










122. Id. at 1941.
123. See id.
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the Supreme Court handed down Stern.124 Accordingly, Sharif filed a
supplemental brief arguing that the Bankruptcy Court’s order against him
should be treated only as a recommendation.125 The District Court denied the
motion due to untimeliness.126 However, upon further appeal, the Seventh
Circuit ruled that Sharif’s objection could not be waived, because count five
of Wellness’s adversary complaint—the “alter-ego” claim—was in fact a
Stern claim.127 Therefore, “the Bankruptcy Court lacked constitutional
authority to enter final judgment [on] count [five],” and Sharif was entitled
to Article III court adjudication.128
Ultimately, this case was appealed to the Supreme Court, which held that
parties could consent to bankruptcy court authority of Stern claims and that
“Article III is not violated when the parties . . . consent to adjudication by a
bankruptcy judge.”129 The Court gave mainly pragmatic reasons for allowing
consent, including that Article III courts still retain “supervisory authority”
over bankruptcy courts.130 The Court also questioned whether Sharif
impliedly consented to bankruptcy court authority.131 To answer this
question, the Court relied heavily on precedent, particularly the 2003
Supreme Court decision in Roell v. Withrow.132
Roell held that litigants can consent to adjudication by a magistrate judge
by “actions rather than words.”133 The Supreme Court did not want to supply
a different rule for bankruptcy courts, and therefore applied Roell’s implied
consent standard, but added that the consent must be “knowing and
voluntary.”134 The Court, again relying on Roell, held that consent is knowing
and voluntary when “the litigant or counsel was made aware of the need for
consent and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily appeared to try the case
before the non-Article III adjudicator.”135 Sharif argued that consent to
bankruptcy court adjudication must be express, but the Court disagreed.136
Aside from citing Roell, the Supreme Court ruled that “[n]othing in the
Constitution requires that consent to adjudication . . . be express . . . [n]or




127. Id. at 1941–42.
128. Id. at 1942.
129. Id. at 1939.
130. Id. at 1944, 1950 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
131. See id. at 1947–49.
132. See id.; see generally Roell v. Withrow, 538 U.S. 580 (2003).
133. Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1948 (citing Roell, 538 U.S. at 589–90).
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting Roell, 538 U.S. at 588 n.5) (internal quotation marks omitted).
136. See id. at 1947.
137. Id.
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B. PROBLEMWITH THEWELLNESS INTERPRETATION OFCONSENT
By allowing implied consent of bankruptcy court adjudication for Stern
claims, the Supreme Court is undermining its pragmatic reasons for allowing
consent in the first place. Some of the main policy reasons underscored by
the Court for allowing implied consent were to increase “judicial
efficiency”138 and presumably lessen the caseload of the district courts.
However, implied consent and the “knowing and voluntary test” are
complicated and may burden the district courts with even more litigation.
For instance, in Wellness, the Court remanded the question of whether
Sharif knowingly and voluntarily, and therefore impliedly, consented to
bankruptcy court adjudication. The Court conceded that the knowing and
voluntary test “would require a deeply factbound analysis” and that the
Supreme Court, being “a court of review, not of first view” could provide
only “little guidance to litigants or the lower courts.”139 The outcome of this
holding is that the Supreme Court initially provides a bare-bones test for
implied consent and further complicates the test by claiming that each case
requires fact-intensive analysis. Also, as a time saver and for financial
reasons, courts will likely rely on more “procedural rules requiring express
consent . . . rather than . . . engaging in subjective, factually intensive
inquiries concerning implied consent” like the Supreme Court suggests.140
The test is also inherently ambiguous. As previously stated, the consent
test under Wellness contains two parts. First, to consent to bankruptcy court
adjudication of Stern claims, the consent must be knowing and voluntary.
Consent is knowing and voluntary when “the litigant or counsel was made
aware of the need for consent and the right to refuse it, and still voluntarily .
. . [tried] the case before a non-Article III adjudicator.”141 The Court does not
distinguish between when a litigant has been made aware of his or her rights
and when he or she was actually aware of those rights enough to consent.142
This lack of distinction may lead to multiple interpretations by courts and
attorneys.
C. THE PROBLEM SPREADS: THEMANYCOURT INTERPRETATIONS
OFCONSENTUNDERWELLNESS
Over 250 cases have cited Wellness, even though the ruling is less than
two years old. As expected, courts interpret the consent standard in multiple
ways. Some courts have applied the Executive Benefits ruling and ignored
138. Id. at 1948.
139. Id. at 1949 (internal quotation marks omitted).
140. Richard K. Milin & Yitzhak Greenberg, Wellness On Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction:
Practically Speaking, Silence Can Mean Consent, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER, May 2015, at 7
(2015).
141. Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1948 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Roell, 538 U.S. at 588 n.5).
142. See Milin & Greenberg, supra note 140, at 7.
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Wellness’ consent test. For instance, In re Renewable Energy Development
Corp.,143 a Tenth Circuit case, involved state law claims as well as
bankruptcy claims.144 The parties brought their claims before a district court,
but the court directed the claims to the bankruptcy court for adjudication,
even though some of the claims were Stern claims.145 On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit acknowledged that the district court erred in directing the case to the
bankruptcy court and also acknowledged that Article III courts cannot send
Stern claims back to bankruptcy courts for adjudication without the consent
of the parties.146 However, instead of analyzing whether the parties’ consent
was “knowing and voluntary” as Wellness proposes, the Tenth Circuit
applied the Executive Benefits holding instead, reasoning that the bankruptcy
court could propose findings of fact but not enter final judgment on the Stern
claims.147
Other courts only seem to look to the parties’ express consent before
allowing bankruptcy courts to adjudicate Stern claims. For example, in In re
TPG Troy, LLC,148 the bankruptcy court ruled that the creditors waived their
right to a jury trial and to collect attorneys’ fees, and, on appeal to the Second
Circuit, the creditors argued that the bankruptcy court did not have the
authority to rule that they waived this right.149 The Second Circuit, relying on
Wellness, analyzed whether the creditors knowingly and voluntarily
consented to bankruptcy court adjudication by determining whether they
were “made aware of the need for consent and the right to refuse it, and still
voluntarily appeared to try the case before the non-Article III adjudicator.”150
The Second Circuit held that the creditors did consent to bankruptcy court
adjudication because they expressly said, during the Bankruptcy Court
proceedings and on the record, “we would be content to consent to Your
Honor determining the fees.”151
Other courts have followed suit, and seem to require express consent by
parties. For instance, In re Waco Town Square Partners, LP,152 a Texas
district court case, mentioned the Wellness knowing and voluntary consent
test, but mainly looked for express consent, like in In re TPG Troy, LLC, to
determine that the parties did not consent to bankruptcy court adjudication
143. See generally In re Renewable Energy Dev. Corp., 792 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2015).
144. See generally id.
145. See id. at 1279.
146. Id.
147. See id. at 1283–84.
148. See generally Crest One Spa v. TPG Troy LLC (In re TPG Troy, LLC), 793 F.3d 228 (2d
Cir. 2015).
149. See id. at 233.
150. Id. at 233 (quoting Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1948 (2015)).
151. Id.
152. See generally In re Waco Town Square Partners, LP, 536 B.R. 756 (S.D. Tex. 2015).
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on a Stern claim.153 As such, during the short time since the Wellness ruling,
courts mention Wellness and implied consent, but in practice, seem to solely
require express consent.
Lastly, courts are applying the Wellness consent standard beyond the
scope of bankruptcy court adjudication. In cases such as Bastidas v.
Chappell154 and Booker v. LaPaglia,155 the courts cite the Wellness consent
test to determine whether non-Article III judges had authority to adjudicate
certain criminal proceedings. In Bastidas, the Ninth Circuit, citingWellness,
held that a magistrate judge lacked authority to issue final judgment on part
of a criminal case.156 The Sixth Circuit stretched the Wellness consent ruling
even further in Booker. There, the question arose as to whether a criminal
case should be remanded or whether the Court of Appeals had final
adjudication authority.157 The Sixth Circuit held that just as the Supreme
Court in Wellness decided it could not review and adjudicate the facts in the
case, because a proper review required a fact-specific analysis usually
reserved for lower courts, the Court of Appeals could not issue final judgment
on the fact-specific issues in Booker and needed to remand the case.158
However, the dissent did note that remanding the case was “an unfortunate
consequence” that would result in a longer litigation process.159 Overall,
applying a test that the Supreme Court itself concedes provides “little
guidance to litigants or the lower courts”160 seems like a dangerous precedent
to set for future claims, both inside and outside of bankruptcy court authority.
IV. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS TO IMPLIED CONSENT
A. NARROW THEDEFINITION OF STERNCLAIMS
In Wellness, the Court majority took the position that the petitioner’s
“alter-ego” claim was a Stern claim, but the three dissenting justices did
not.161 This indicates that a more coherent definition of Stern claims needs to
be applied to avoid confusion between bankruptcy and district court
authority. One possibility is for courts to create a bright-line rule and define
Stern claims as only those claims dealing with state law issues. Recently,
bankruptcy courts seem to be avoiding adjudication of state law claims, as
they are arguably the most easily discernible Stern claims that require Article
153. Id. at 762. The Court held that unlike in in Troy where the record indicated that the creditors
expressly consented, consent was not expressly stated by the debtors in Waco. In re Troy, 793 F.3d
at 233; In re Waco, 536 B.R. at 762.
154. See generally Bastidas v. Chappell, 791 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2015).
155. See generally Booker v. LaPaglia, 617 Fed. App’x 520 (6th Cir. 2015).
156. See Bastidas, 791 F.3d at 1155, 1161, 1164.
157. See Booker, 617 Fed. App’x at 524–26.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 536 (Moore, J., dissenting).
160. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1949 (2015).
161. See generally id.; see alsoMilin & Greenberg, supra note 140, at 7.
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III court adjudication.162 However, reducing Stern claims to only state law
claims may exclude other claims, like federal fraudulent transfer claims, that
may require Article III court judgment.
In the Wellness dissent, Chief Justice Roberts analyzed old bankruptcy
statutes in an attempt to determine what has historically constituted a Stern
claim.163 Looking at “America’s first bankruptcy statute” Justice Roberts
found that bankruptcy courts’ “power to take into their possession, all the
estate, real and personal, of every nature and description to which the debtor
may be entitled, either in law or equity, in any manner whatsoever” is
“peculiarly a bankruptcy power.”164 Looking to the 1898 Act, he found that
bankruptcy court adjudicatory authority did not extend to situations where
third parties make “substantial adverse claim[s]” over property in a debtor’s
possession.165 Although looking to old statutes provides a solid foundation as
to what may constitute a Stern claim, the task of looking at hundreds of years
of bankruptcy law seems arduous.
Section 157(b)(2) provides a non-exhaustive list of sixteen examples of
core proceedings to a bankruptcy case.166 This list includes matters
concerning the administration of the estate;167 counterclaims by the estate
against persons filing claims against the estate;168 proceedings to determine,
avoid, or recover fraudulent conveyances;169 and determinations as to the
dischargeability of particular debts.170 As such, a solid starting point in
defining Stern claims would be to go through the sixteen examples of core
proceedings in Section 157(b)(2) and create examples of possible Stern or
non-Stern claims. Cases such as Executive Benefits have already started
determining some examples of Stern claims that were previously labeled
solely as core claims under Section 157(b)(2).171
Providing initial examples of Stern claims using Section 157(b)(2) poses
some additional problems. First, Congress, when enacting Section 157(b)(2),
meant for all sixteen examples to be core proceedings; to identify any of the
examples as Stern claims may undermine congressional intent. Also, creating
examples of Stern claims by looking at Section 157(b)(2) may be arduous
162. See Kevin M. Hembree, How Bankruptcy Courts Are Dealing With ‘Stern Claims,’ LAW360
(Apr. 22, 2015, 10:33 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/646155/how-bankruptcy-courts-are-
dealing-with-stern-claims.
163. See Wellness, 135 S. Ct. at 1952–53 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 1952 (internal quotation marks omitted).
165. See id. at 1953 (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (2012).
167. Id. § 157(b)(2)(A).
168. Id. § 157(b)(2)(C).
169. Id. § 157(b)(2)(H).
170. Id. § 157(b)(2)(I).
171. See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2172 (2014). In Executive
Benefits, the Supreme Court determined that the fraudulent conveyance claim at issue in the case
was most likely a Stern claim, even though recovery of fraudulent conveyances was listed as a core
claim under Section 157(b)(2)(H). See id. at 2171–72.
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and arbitrary, as a court will rely on the specific facts of a case in order to
determine whether a claim that falls under Section 157(b)(2) is a Stern claim
or not. For example, two distinct cases may contain “matters concerning the
administration of the estate,”172 but the “matters” may be completely
different. In other words, depending on the facts, a “matter” in one case may
constitute a Stern claim, while a “matter” in another case may not. In sum,
attempting to create examples of Stern claims from this non-exhaustive list
may present more problems than solutions.
B. EXTEND EXECUTIVE BENEFITS
As previously stated, Executive Benefits held that Stern claims may be
treated as non-core claims and that bankruptcy courts, therefore, do not have
the authority to adjudicate Stern claims treated like non-core claims.173
Executive Benefits did not address whether parties could consent, explicitly
or implicitly, to bankruptcy court adjudication of Stern claims, but it could
have easily applied Federal Bankruptcy Rule 7012(b) to answer the consent
question. In his concurring opinion in Wellness, Justice Alito mentions the
use of Federal Bankruptcy Rule 7012(b) as evidence that express consent of
the parties is required, because it states, “[i]n non-core proceedings final
orders and judgments shall not be entered on the bankruptcy judge’s order
except with the express consent of the parties.”174 In other words, 7012(b)
requires express consent of the parties to bankruptcy courts’ final judgments
in non-core proceedings.175 Therefore, when a Stern claim is brought before
a bankruptcy court, the court should treat the claim as a non-core proceeding
and only allow the parties to expressly consent to bankruptcy court
adjudication under 7012(b). This solution eliminates implied consent
proposed in Wellness.
One problem with extending the holding of Executive Benefits to allow
for bankruptcy court adjudication with express consent of the parties is that
the case’s treatment of some Stern claims as non-core claims is troublesome.
Non-core matters are statutorily defined in Section 157(c)(1) as “not a core
proceeding, but [a proceeding] that is otherwise related to a case under Title
11.”176 On the other hand, Stern claims are not mentioned in Section 157;
rather, they are a product of case law. Stern claims are a constantly litigated
issue; to haphazardly group them as non-core claims virtually erases the
many court interpretations of the controversial claims.
172. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A).
173. See Exec. Benefits, 134 S. Ct. at 2173.
174. Wellness Int’l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1949 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring)
(quoting FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(b)).
175. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(b).
176. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
254 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 11
C. AMEND SECTION 157
Another possible solution is to add a new rule to the Bankruptcy Code
requiring parties to expressly consent to bankruptcy court authority over core
claims. The rule would combine the consent provisions of Section
157(c)(2)177 and the “express consent” language of Federal Bankruptcy Rule
7012(b).178 As an alternative, a new rule could be added to explicitly address
Stern claims and consent. For example, in her article, author Bethany A.
Corbin suggests adding a new section to Section 157—157(b)(4)—that
allows parties to consent to bankruptcy court adjudication of Stern claims:
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b)(1), the district court, with
the consent of all the parties to a proceeding, may refer a core proceeding
related to a bankruptcy case to a bankruptcy judge to hear and determine
and to enter appropriate orders and judgments, subject to review under
section 158 of this title.179
This provision would bypass the issue of whether Stern claims are core or
non-core, and allow bankruptcy courts to still have adjudicative authority.
Even though adding consent requirements for core matters would be a
viable solution to bankruptcy court adjudication issues, amending bankruptcy
laws poses a few problems. First, amending the Bankruptcy Code to allow
parties to expressly consent to bankruptcy court adjudication of Stern claims
(i.e. claims that bankruptcy courts cannot constitutionally adjudicate), allows
parties to consent to constitutional violations. In other words, bankruptcy
courts cannot adjudicate Stern claims because the courts’ adjudication would
violate Article III of the Constitution. However, if you allow parties to
consent to bankruptcy court adjudication of Stern claims, the parties are
inadvertently violating Article III. The Supreme Court acknowledged this
conundrum in Wellness, but the justices could not agree on a solution that
would allow parties to consent to bankruptcy court adjudication of Stern
claims without overstepping constitutional boundaries.180
Second, amending statutes is a lengthy, slow process, and the fact that so
many courts have differed on how to address Stern claims would likely make
the process even slower.181 Congress may be looking to the courts for more
guidance on Stern claims before reforming Section 157. A more likely reason
for Congress’s slow response is that Congress does not want to attempt to
amend the bankruptcy laws, because, historically, the Courts have always
intervened.182 For instance, just four years after Congress enacted the 1978
177. See id. § 157(c)(2).
178. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7012(b).
179. Corbin, supra note 19, at 145.
180. See Milin & Greenberg, supra note 140, at 5–6.
181. See Corbin, supra note 19, at 146.
182. See id.
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Act, the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline declared the 1978 Act
unconstitutional.183 Stern also declared parts of 1984 Act unconstitutional;
however, the 1984 Act did fair better than the 1978 Act, going unchallenged
for nearly twenty years.184 Nevertheless, judging from history, Congress
likely does not want to alter the bankruptcy laws because the courts
frequently strike down such attempts as unconstitutional.
D. USING THE BALANCING TEST FROM PRIORCASES TO
DETERMINE BANKRUPTCYCOURTAUTHORITY
The courts could revert to using the balancing test applied in previous
cases to determine bankruptcy court authority. As previously mentioned,
prior to Stern v. Marshall, courts used a balancing test to determine whether
a claim was core or non-core. The factors of the balancing test, as expounded
in cases such as Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,185
included weighing the intent of Article I courts against protecting Article III
courts, while also keeping in mind separation-of-powers principles.186 In his
Stern dissent, Justice Breyer mentioned the revival of this balancing test, and
listed five factors the courts could use to determine whether bankruptcy
courts had final judgment authority on certain claims.187 These five factors
are: (1) the nature of the adjudicated claim; (2) the type of non-Article III
court adjudicating the claim; (3) the extent to which Article III courts usually
exercise control over the proceeding; (4) the presence or absence of the
parties’ consent; and (5) the weighing of the legislative purpose of granting
non-Article III judges similar powers to Article III judges.188By applying this
balancing test approach, Justice Breyer, with Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor
and Kagan joining, concluded that the adjudicatory authority of the
bankruptcy court in Stern was constitutional.189
A modern balancing test could include a combination of elements from
previous cases and the Stern dissent. First, the court could determine whether
or not “a congressional delegation of adjudicatory authority violates [the]
separation-of-powers principles inherent in Article III.”190 Second, the court
could consider several factors, including the five emphasized by the Stern
dissent. Third, the court could determine whether a private or public right is
at issue. If a private right is at issue, the court could implement a more in-
183. See Gerber, supra note 18, at 1000.
184. See Corbin, supra note 19, at 146.
185. See generally Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
186. See id. at 851.
187. See Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462, 510–13 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 513 (emphasis added).
189. See id.
190. William C. Heuer, Current State of Play: How to Analyze Authority of Bankruptcy Courts
to Enter Final Orders and Judgments, 24 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1 (2015).
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depth review of the factors. If a public right is at issue, the review could be
“less stringent.”191
Another separation-of-powers issue may arise if courts implement the
balancing test. The balancing test allows Congress to create legislation that
gives non-Article III judges Article III powers. The dissent in Schor
hypothesizes that Congress could overstep its power, and “create[] a large
number of non-article III tribunals . . . to subvert the integrity of the
independent federal judiciary.” 192 Also, the balancing test mentions consent,
but it does not mention whether or not that consent should be express or
implied.193 As such, the balancing test could likely be difficult to implement
because of separation-of-powers concerns and the incompleteness of the
test’s factors.
CONCLUSION
For years, courts struggled with whether parties could consent to
bankruptcy court adjudication of Stern claims. TheWellness Court ruled that
parties could impliedly consent to bankruptcy court adjudication of Stern
claims, but the test the Court created is ambiguous and pragmatically difficult
to administer. The judicial system would benefit from allowing parties to
expressly consent to bankruptcy courts’ final adjudication on Stern claims.
This would help evenly distribute the caseload between bankruptcy courts
and district courts, and would arguably lessen litigation in the future, due to
a resulting lack of ambiguity.
To that end, this Note posits four possible approaches. The courts could
provide examples of Stern claims using Section 157 to more easily discern
what claims bankruptcy courts can or cannot adjudicate. Courts could also
extend the holding of Executive Benefits to allow for parties to expressly
consent to bankruptcy courts’ adjudication of Stern claims. Additionally,
Congress could amend Section 157 to allow parties to consent to bankruptcy
court adjudication of Stern claims. Lastly, the courts could use the balancing
test applied in previous cases to determine bankruptcy court authority.
Overall, courts or the legislature could use these possible solutions to resolve
the many complexities surrounding Stern claims.
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